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In this paper, I will question the traditional definition according to which the creative process is the
solving of especially complex problems. After a brief introduction, I aim to show that every instance
of successful problem solving constitutes a creative process which results in a creative product. In
this view, the conventionally assumed relationship of creativity and problem solving is reversed,
for creativity is not regarded as a special case of problem solving but (successful) problem solving
is regarded as creativity.
Creativity is considered one of the most important human competencies. It is the basis for
extraordinary achievements in the arts and sciences, and enables people to adapt to changing
demands (Baas et al., 2015). As creativity is among the currently most valued and desired abilities,
researchers try to understand how it works and how it can be promoted. Research in this field
is traditionally divided into the four strands creative person, creative process, creative press,
and creative product, which Rhodes (1961) terms the “Four Ps” of creativity. Recently, creative
persuasion, and creative potential have evolved as further areas of interest (Runco and Kim, 2011).
The creative product takes a superior role among these strands insofar as all other lines of creativity
research depend on the creative product (Groeben, 2013b): A creative person is thought of as
someone who often comes up with creative ideas, i.e., someone who generates many creative
products. Likewise, the creative process is usually defined as comprising all mental and behavioral
events by which a person fabricates a creative product. Creative press refers to the properties of an
environment which fosters or impairs the generation of a creative product. Creative persuasion
is the extent to which the perception or use of a creative product changes recipients’ beliefs.
And finally, the creative potential is the capacity of a person to generate many creative products.
Consequently, although this essay deals with the creative process, the creative product must also
be kept in mind. The creative product is commonly defined as follows: A product is creative, if it
is both novel and useful. The combination of novelty and usefulness is sometimes called effective
novelty (Cropley, 2011).
While in earlier times, especially around 1800, only “real geniuses” were considered capable of
generating creative products, creativity research has been dominated by a general democratization
from about 1950 onwards (Groeben, 2013a). Nowadays it is commonly assumed that, in principle,
everyone can be creative, albeit not to the same degree, as there will always be differences
between subjects regarding the frequency and quality of creative products they generate (Cropley,
2011; Groeben, 2013a). The democratization of creativity necessitated a reconsideration of the
definition of the creative product. Up to that point, it was understood that only “absolutely”
novel products, i.e., ideas new to everyone in a society or even in the world, meet the
requirements of a creative product. But with the change in perspective, this definition had
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to be extended to include products which are not necessarily new
to all members of society but only to some, or in the extreme
case, only to the individual who created the product. In line with
this reasoning, Boden (1994) distinguishes between historical
novelty as contributing to historical creativity (“H-creativity”)
and personal novelty as contributing to personal creativity (“P-
creativity”). Likewise, the view which deals exclusively with
socially relevant achievements and the perspective that includes
personally relevant achievements are often differentiated and
symbolized as Big C and little c, respectively (Kaufman and
Beghetto, 2009).
Having introduced some important concepts, I will now turn
to the gist of this essay: the creative process. Various models
conceive of the creative process as consisting of a series of phases,
a notion which is often traced back to Wallas (1926). Most
of the models include the four stages preparation, incubation,
illumination, and verification. Preparation is a stage of intense
conscious work during which information is looked for and
a problem is formulated. During incubation, the problem is
not consciously dealt with. Instead, unconscious processes can
be at work and combine relevant pieces of information which
were gathered during preparation. Illumination is characterized
by a sudden insight into the solution of the problem, often
referred to as “Aha!” experience (Kim, 2009). The verification
stage is required to check and elaborate the solution. Since
Wallas’ proposition, many conceptualizations of the creative
process have been put forward (e.g., Suler, 1980; Rothenberg,
1996; Simonton, 2003; Nijstad et al., 2010; Allen and Thomas,
2011). In what follows, I will comment on the widely held
assumption that the creative process is a special form of problem
solving, which is also referred to as creative problem solving (e.g.,
Treffinger and Parnes, 1979; Carson and Runco, 1999). More
precisely, my deliberations will focus on a specific version of this
hypothesis according to which the creative process is the solving
of complex/dynamic problems (overview: Groeben, 2013b).
Before contesting this view, it is necessary to outline some
basic assumptions which are held in problem solving research.
This field of research typically makes a distinction between
problems and tasks, so as to clarify its subject matter. According
to a classic definition, a problem “arises if a living creature
has a goal but does not know how this goal is to be reached”
(Duncker, 1945, p. 1). Accordingly, the subject cannot achieve
the desired goal simply by acting but needs to have recourse to
thinking. If, on the other hand, a person wants to achieve a goal
and is in principle familiar with steps leading toward that goal,
then the person is dealing with a task as opposed to a problem
(Groeben, 2013b). Whether or not a desired aim constitutes a
problem depends, among other things, on the subject’s skills
(Funke, 2003). Solving the term 239–14, for instance, constitutes
a (very easy) task for a vast majority of adults: Even if they
cannot retrieve the solution directly from memory, they know
the rules of subtraction, and these rules can be immediately
applied in order to arrive at the solution. For preschoolers,
however, this calculation constitutes a (most likely unsolvable)
problem, because most of them do not know how to subtract
multi-digit numbers. Hence, solving tasks involves procedures
which are generally known to the subject, but solving problems
involves procedures which are generally not known and therefore
novel to the subject. Apart from the distinction between tasks
and problems, problem solving researchers distinguish between
different types of problems. Among these distinctions the one
between simple/static and complex/dynamic1 problems is of
special importance to creativity research, because the creative
process is often conceived of as the solving of complex problems.
Although the properties of these and other types of problems
are quite explicitly described in the literature, it is as yet unclear
to what extent differences in problem characteristics correspond
to differences in the solution process (Funke, 2006). Therefore
we still do not know which cognitive processes are involved
in solving simple vs. complex problems, and even less whether
the solution of complex problems, for instance, always requires
more complex cognition than the solution of simple problems
(Funke, 2010). This can be illustrated with two examples: In the
Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP), a list of locations and the
distances between each pair of locations are given. The aim is to
find the shortest route that visits each location exactly once and
returns to the starting point. Although the TSP meets the criteria
of a static problem, it seems to require very complex cognitive
processes, for no algorithm has been found yet which always
yields the optimal solution. On the other hand, the handling
of continually developing and advancing technical devices, such
as smartphones, computer systems, or vending machines, is
classified as dynamic problem solving (Greiff et al., 2012). Such
problems, however, are often—albeit not always—solved quite
quickly and without greater efforts as part of an everyday routine,
which suggests that their solution does not necessarily involve
very complex procedures.
In what way, then, does the creative process resemble problem
solving? At the beginning of a creative process, there is always
some kind of deficiency, for which the subject does not know
a remedy. Thus, the creative process starts with a problem, and
it is commonly accepted that a creative product is generated by
means of problem solving. However, if one bears in mind that
the understanding of creativity has been generally democratized,
certain objections can be put forward against the view that only
the solution of particularly difficult or complex problems may
lead to creative products.
As elaborated above, the differentiation between simple
and complex problems has proven beneficial for determining
the characteristics of these two problem types. However, this
distinction does not seem to help identifying the cognitive and
behavioral processes with which various problems are solved—
and this is exactly what one aims at when examining the creative
process. If the analysis of the creative process is restricted to
complex problem solving, which appears to be common practice
in contemporary creativity research, problem types which at
first glance do not seem to involve complex cognitive processes
and hence do not seem to imply creativity may be excluded
from the analysis, although their solution may in fact require
a lot of creativity. If one follows this line of argument, the
1Funke (2003) suggests that simple problems should be termed static and complex
problems dynamic. Hence, the terms simple/static problem and complex/dynamic
problem are used interchangeably in this essay.
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assumption that the creative process is the solution of complex
problems needs to be modified and the creative process needs to
be regarded as problem solving. In other words, problem solving
has to be considered a necessary condition of the creative process.
In my view, however, this modified notion of the creative
process can be challenged as well, and we even have to go one
step further. For, if the above question “In what way does the
creative process resemble problem solving?” is reversed to “In
what way does problem solving resemble creativity?,” it becomes
obvious that every instance of successful problem solving implies
a creative process, given that one follows the democratization of
creativity and admits P-creativity: The solution of a problemmust
be new to the solver, because if the subject had been acquainted
with the solution from the outset, it would not be a problem,
but a task (see above). Thus, every solution of a problem is novel
(to the subject). In addition, the solution of a problem is always
useful; otherwise the problem would not have been successfully
solved. This means that all problem solutions meet the criterion
of effective novelty and hence are creative products. And as the
procedures yielding a creative product are said to constitute a
creative process, successful problem solving can be regarded as a
creative process. It can be deducted, then, that the conventionally
held relation between creativity and problem solving is reversed,
in that the creative process does not constitute a special case of
problem solving, but successful problem solving can be regarded
as a sufficient condition of the creative process.
What conclusions can be drawn from this line of argument?
The first consequence is that the view of the creative process
must be changed in the direction of further democratization
and demystification. At present, it is accepted that the creative
process does not involve any mystic or godlike properties (Kim,
2009), but, following the above deliberations, one would have
to go further and regard the creative process as no more than
regular problem solving. Hence, designations such as creative
problem solving appear to contain a redundancy. Second, a
closer cooperation of creativity research and problem solving
research suggests itself. If the creative process is the same as
problem solving, then scientific investigations should examine
it as such, using appropriate methods, i.e., the methods of
problem solving research. This does not mean that we can now
dispense with creativity research altogether. Rather, one should
bear in mind what both research traditions have in common
and how each could benefit from the other. Third, once a new
perspective of the creative product and the creative process has
been discussed, this may also have ramifications for the two
remaining strands of creativity research, the creative person and
creative press. If the creative product and process can be seen
from the perspective of problem solving research, could this also
apply to the creative person and the creative press? Can creative
persons be viewed as sharing relevant traits with persons who
like to solve problems and often do so? Can the creative press be
compared to an environment which promotes problem solving?
I would like to suggest that creativity research could obtain
more differentiated knowledge of its field if it investigated to
what extent creativity is different from or identical with problem
solving.
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